Calling all the Christian/Muslim doners, governments/NGOs/fund managers to donate Christian KNU/KNLA to fight BUDDHIST TERRORISTS DKBA at Thai Myanmar border

Calling all the Christian/Muslim doners,

governments/NGOs/fund managers

to donate Christian KNU/KNLA

to fight BUDDHIST TERRORISTS DKBA

at Thai Myanmar border

We hereby made a sincere request to CIA, NATO, EU, Libya (leader Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi1), Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran’s leader president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), Syria  (President Bashar al-Assad), Al Qaeda, Abu Sayaf group, Hisbollah, Hamas groups, Taliban, Jemaah Islamiah (JI),etc to consider supporting with financial and ammunition supports to donate Christian KNU/KNLA to fight BUDDHIST TERRORISTS DKBA at Thai Myanmar border.

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Why Should Democracy Be Shy?

We gave to look at international relations a a competition, because Russia and China already see it that way.

By Christopher Werth | NEWSWEEK

June 9,2008

Robert Kagan believes a war is coming. Not necessarily one with guns and bombs, but his new book argues that a fundamental global divide is emerging between liberal democracies and autocratic governments—namely Russia and China. He and presidential hopeful John McCain, whom he advises, call for a League of Democracies, which the Republican candidate has pledged to pursue if he wins the November election. NEWSWEEK’s Christopher Werth spoke with Kagan about the ascendancy of great-power competition. Continue reading

Is there no more hope for US intervention in Burma?

Is there no more hope for US intervention in Burma?

New York Times

Op-Ed Contributor MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT

Madeleine K. Albright was the United States secretary of state from 1997 to 2001.

THE Burmese government’s criminally neglectful response to last month’s cyclone, and the world’s response to that response, illustrate three grim realities today: totalitarian governments are alive and well; their neighbors are reluctant to pressure them to change; and the notion of national sovereignty as sacred is gaining ground, helped in no small part by the disastrous results of the American invasion of Iraq. Indeed, many of the world’s necessary interventions in the decade before the invasion — in places like Haiti and the Balkans — would seem impossible in today’s climate.

The first and most obvious reality is the survival of totalitarian government in an age of global communications and democratic progress. Myanmar’s military junta employs the same set of tools used by the likes of Stalin to crush dissent and monitor the lives of citizens. The needs of the victims of Cyclone Nargis mean nothing to a regime focused solely on preserving its own authority.

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Intervene in Burma Now

Intervene in Burma Now

_ by Yebaw Day  in Burma Digest

1. ChiCom Masters are too busy with their Earthquake victims, and also in suppressing the Tibetans, and preparing for the Olympics, so they will not be able to help SPDC very much.
 
2. SPDC just lost about 300 men and 25 boats in their navy, and lost the South West Command in Pathein area.  So the entire Irrawaddy Division area is quite vulnerable for a beach landing, just like in the movie, the Longest Day, D-Day 6 June 1944. Continue reading

Since 2002, the European Union has intervened abroad sixteen times in three different continents (in Burmese)

 “We should not let people die.”

 

သုံးသပ္သူ- (ms)
နားဂစ္ေလေဘးဒုကၡသည္ ကယ္ဆယ္ေရးလုပ္ငန္း ေႏွးေကြးေနမူ႔ေၾကာင္႔ ေသဆုံးမူ႔ ဟာတေန႔ထက္ေန႔ ပုိမုိမ်ားၿပားေနပါတယ္။ ဒီလုိ ကယ္ဆယ္ေရးလုပ္ငန္း အဓိက ေႏွးေကြးေနမူ႔ဟာ မေကာင္းဆုိး၀ါးမိစၦာဓိဌိ စစ္အာဏာရွင္ေတြက ႏုိင္္ငံတကာ အကူအညီ ေပးေရးအဖြဲ႕ မ်ားကုိ၀င္ေရာက္ကူညီခြင္႔မၿပဳဘဲ ၿငင္းဆန္ေနတာေၾကာင္႔ ၿဖစ္ပါတယ္။

 

Since 2002, the European Union has intervened

abroad sixteen times in three different continents

primarily for humanitarian reasons.

ၿပင္သစ္၊ၿဗိတိန္၊ဂ်ာမနီ၊အေမရိကန္၊ဆြီဒင္၊ဒိန္းမတ္၊ ဘယ္ဂ်ီယံ၊ အီတလီအပါအ၀င္ ဥေရာပႏုိင္ငံ အစုိးရ ေတြကေတာ႔ ဒီလုိလုပ္ရပ္ဟာလူသားမဆန္တဲ႔ၿပဳလုပ္မူ႔၊ လူသားေတြအေပၚ က်ဴးလြန္တဲ႔ အစုလုိက္အၿပံဳလိုက္ေသဆုံးမူ႔အေပၚ တာ၀န္ရွိတာေၾကာင္႔ မေကာင္းဆုိး၀ါးမိစၦာစစ္ဗုိလ္ခ်ဴပ္ေတြဟာ ရာဇ၀တ္မႈ႔ က်ဴးလြန္းေနၾကတာၿဖစ္ေၾကာင္း ( Crimes against humanity လုိ႔ ) မေန႔ကၿပင္းၿပင္းထန္ထန္သတိေပးေၿပာၾကားလုိက္ပါတယ္။

အရင္တုန္းက လူ႔အခြင္႔ အေရးအဖြဲ႔အစည္းေတြသာဒီလုိရွဴံ႕ ခ် ခဲ႔ၾကတာၿဖစ္ေပမဲ႔၊ ႏုိင္ငံတကာအစုိးရေတြပါ ဒီလုိပါ၀င္ ရွဴံ႕ ခ် လာေနတာေၾကာင္႔ မေကာင္းဆုိး၀ါးမိစၦာ စစ္ဗုိလ္ခ်ဴပ္ေတြရဲ႕ ေနာက္ဆုံး ေန႔ရက္ဟာ ပုိမုိ နီးကပ္လာၿပီ လုိ႕ ယူဆေၾကာင္း ႏုိင္ငံေရးေလ႔လာေနသူေတြက ေၿပာဆုိေန ၾကပါတယ္။

ရ၀မ္ဒါ ေဒသမွာလူသားေတြ အစုလုိက္အၿပံဳလုိက္သတ္ၿဖတ္ခံခဲ႔ရမူ႔ ကုိ ကမၻာ႔ႏိုင္ငံေတြက မဟန္႔တားနုိင္ခ႔ဲတာ ကုိဥပမာယူၿပီး၊ ၿမန္မာႏုိင္ငံ နားဂစ္ေလေဘးဒုကၡသည္ေတြအေပၚ ကုလသမဂၢ အပါအ၀င္ ကမၻာ႔ႏုိင္ငံ ၾကီးအစုိးရေတြ အေနႏွင္႔ အၿမန္ဆုံးအေရးယူ ေဆာင္ရြက္အကူအညီ ေပးသင္႔ေၾကာင္: ႏုိင္ငံတကာ လူ႔အခြင္႔အေရးအဖြဲ႔အစည္း ေတြ ႏွင္႔ ၿမန္မာၿပည္သူေတြက ေတာင္းဆုိေနၾကပါတယ္။ အရင္တုန္းက လူသားေတြ အစုလုိက္္အၿပံဳလုိက္ သတ္ၿဖတ္ ခံခဲ႔ရမူ႔အေပၚ ကုလသမဂၢ ႏွင္႔ ကမၻာ႔ႏုိင္ငံ ၾကီးအစုိးရေတြက အကာအကြယ္ေပးမူ႔ေတြ ကုိ ၿပန္လည္ ေလ႔လာၾကည္႕ယင္—–

 

 

 

 

Examples of past possible humanitarian interventions include:



ဒီေန႔အမၻာ႔ႏုိင္ငံအစုိးရေတြအေနႏွင္႔ၿမန္မာႏုိင္ငံလက္ရွိအေၿခအေနအေပၚအၿမန္ဆုံးအေရးေပၚအစည္း အေ၀းေခၚယူၿပီ——–

  • (၁) မေကာင္းဆုိး၀ါးမိစၦာ စစ္ဗုိလ္ခ်ဴပ္ေတြဟာ နားဂစ္ေလေဘးဒုကၡသည္ ကယ္ဆယ္ေရး လုပ္ငန္းေတြမွာ ဆက္လက္ၿပီး ႏုိင္ငံတကာႏွင္႔ပူးေပါင္းေဆာင္ ရြက္မူ႔မရွိလွ်င္၊ မိမိတုိ႔၏သံတမန္မ်ားကုိအၿမန္ဆုံးၿပန္လည္ေခၚယူၿပီး၊သံတမန္ေရးရာဖိအားေပးမူ႔ႏွင္႔အေရးယူမူ႔ ကုိတၿပိဳင္တည္းၿပဳလုပ္သင္႔သည္။
  • (၂)မိမိတုိ႔၏သံတမန္မ်ားကုိအၿမန္ဆုံးၿပန္လည္ေခၚယူၿပီးေနာက္ထူးၿခားတုိးတက္မူ႔မရွိလွ်င္၊ႏုိင္ငံတကာအစုိးရမ်ားအေနႏွင္႔ လူသားခ်င္းစာနာေထာက္ထားၿပီး၊ လူသားေတြရဲ႕ အသက္ကယ္ဆယ္ေရး (Humanitarian Intervention ) ကုိ ခြင္႔ၿပဳခ်က္မယူဘဲ အၿမန္ဆုံးၿပဳလုပ္ပါ။
  • (၃)လူသားေတြရဲ႕အသက္ကယ္ဆယ္ေရး (Humanitarian intervention ) ကုိ ေႏွာက္ရွက္မူ႔ ၿပဳလုပ္လွ်င္ေသာ္လည္းေကာင္း၊ စစ္ေရးတုန္႔ၿပန္မူ႔ၿပဳလုပ္လွ်င္ မေကာင္းဆုိး၀ါးမိစၦာ စစ္ဗုိလ္ခ်ဴပ္ေတြ ေနထုိင္ရာၾကပ္ေၿပးေနၿပည္ေတာ္ႏွင္႔္ မေကာင္းဆုိး၀ါးမိစၦာ စစ္ဗုိလ္ခ်ဴပ္မ်ားကုိ ၿပစ္မွတ္ထား တုိက္ခုိက္ပါ။
  • (၄)မေကာင္းဆုိး၀ါးမိစၦာ စစ္ဗုိလ္ခ်ဴပ္မ်ားအတြက္ၿမန္မာၿပည္စစ္ေလယာဥ္မ်ားအားၿပန္သန္းခြင္႔ “No Fly Zone အၿဖစ္” ပိတ္ဆုိ႔ပါ။

 

Humanitarian intervention refers to armed interference in one state by another (or more) state with the stated objective of ending or reducing suffering within the first state. That suffering may be the result of civil war, humanitarian crisis, or crimes by the first state including genocide. The goal of humanitarian intervention is neither annexation nor interference with territorial integrity, but minimization of the suffering of civilians in that state. The claimed rationale behind such an intervention is the belief, embodied in international customary law in a duty under certain circumstances to disregard a state’s sovereignty to preserve our common humanity.

Defenders of humanitarian intervention justify it primarily in the name of a moral imperative: “we should not let people die.” This idea is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, written in 1948. For these defenders, intervention is only legitimate when it is motivated by a massive violation of human rights and when it is put in motion by an international body, typically the United Nations Security Council. In particular Article 28 announces a right to a social and international order in which human rights are realized. Further, the Chapter Seven powers of the United Nations Security Council are often used to legitimate intervention for stopping any threats to international peace and security. From the 1990s the understanding of what constituted threats to international peace were radically broadened to include such things as the movement of refugees, to justify intervention into Somalia and Yugoslavia. These two countries were the first that the United Nations intervened without gaining permission from the States involved. In practice, humanitarian intervention actions are often carried out by coalitions of nations, which can create two somewhat different situations: Humanitarian Intervention

The right to interfere, which constitutes jus ad bellum, a term coined by the philosopher Jean-François Revel in 1979, is the recognition of the right of one or many nations to violate the national sovereignty of another state, when a mandate has been granted by a supranational authority. In practice, because of humanitarian emergencies, it is common that the mandate is provided retroactively; for instance, France’s intervention in Côte d’Ivoire was made initially without a UN mandate.

The duty to interfere is an obligation which falls to all nation-states to provide assistance at the request of the supranational authority, to the extent possible. Obviously, this notion is the closest to the original concept of humanitarian intervention, except that a right translates into a duty, and is managed by a supranational authority. Humanitarian Intervention and Relational Sovereignty By Dr. Helen Stacy Humanitarian intervention with military force has no firm theory under the international legal apparatus because sovereignty, the inviolate claim of a nation state against all others, is a legal shield against outside intervention in a nation’s internal affairs.

1 The United Nations Charter under Article 2(4) prohibits the “threat or use of force” against another state, even when civil bloodshed is creating humanitarian disasters.

2 The Charter allows only two exceptions to this prohibition: Article 51 in Chapter VII of the Charter allows a nation to use force in self-defense if an armed attack occurs against it or an allied country,

3 and the United Nations Security Council is authorized to employ force to counter threats to breaches of international peace.

4 Humanitarian intervention rests upon the unconvincing fiction of the danger that a civil conflict may spill over a nation’s borders, at least if it is to be justified under the U.N. Charter. A better account of the fate of national sovereignty in cases of international humanitarian intervention in human rights disasters derives from what I call a theory of Relational Sovereignty.

5 This theory arises under today’s conditions of globalization and describes the role of the sovereign government as an obligation to meeting its citizens’ civil, political, social and economic needs, according to the government’s capacity, and always working for its citizens’ good. A government fails in its governance role when its murderous, corrupt, or persistently neglectful actions lead to serious human rights harms. Under the theory of relational sovereignty, widespread and extreme harm to citizens is evidence that sovereignty is no longer an absolute shield against international intervention. Put differently, relational sovereignty puts human rights at the heart of good governance.

6 A widespread and extreme humanitarian crisis alters sovereignty in two ways: First, citizens rather than the government are seen as the bearers of their national sovereignty. If their government no longer represents their best interest, the nation’s sovereignty no longer coalesces in its government. Second, citizens rely on the international community to express their sovereign interest in good governance when they themselves are unable to depose a government that harms them. In other words, their national borders have metaphorically fractured, allowing other nations in the international community to step across to their assistance. When sovereignty is seen this way – as an obligation of attentive governance, which the international community can insist upon on behalf of a nation’s citizens – it need not be breached when humanitarian intervention takes place. This temporary dispersal of national sovereignty from a nation’s citizens to the international community is easiest to map onto humanitarian crises of murderous civil conflict. It is more difficult to map onto humanitarian crises of malnutrition and starvation. But I argue here that humanitarian intervention may also be justifiable for massive cases of letting-die, such as starvation and disease. In other words, national sovereignty cannot shield corrupt or neglectful governments that fail to distribute essential sustenance – food, medical care, and essential services – to their citizens in exigent circumstances. International morality is invoked not only for the commissions of nation states, but also for their intentional omissions. My argument is that widespread death by malnutrition or disease should make a government just as culpable as death by civil violence, where a government that has the capacity to prevent starvation and disease fails to do so. When a government negligently fails to prevent a national crisis that leads to widespread death, that government’s claim to inviolate sovereignty qua other nations or the international community is invalid. But expanding humanitarian intervention into a general license for war against repressive regimes is dangerous. The equitable principles of fairness show that humanitarian interventions should be restricted to very few situations. In what follows, I set out the problems with the legal apparatus of humanitarian interventions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and how this apparatus is out of step with an emerging notion of sovereignty. Using Relational Sovereignty as a theory for lowering the defense of sovereignty against the legitimacy of international humanitarian interventions, and using familiar principles of equity and individual rescue in tort, I set out three limiting principles for international humanitarian intervention, and then briefly test these against the ongoing U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.

(B.) The Problem with Interventions under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter The last decade of humanitarian intervention has been a patchwork of inconsistent justifications, too-often sluggish international responses, and varying degrees of efficacy in bringing assistance to failed states. On the face of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, intervention in purely civil unrest contravenes the principles of national sovereignty. There is no mention in the Charter for intervention on purely humanitarian grounds. And yet there have been several Chapter VII interventions in recent years. In each of the humanitarian crises of Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia, the U.N. has authorized intervention across national borders.

7 In each of these cases, internal national conflicts were incongruously reinterpreted as wars that could spill into other nations so that Chapter VII could be made to fit. Not surprisingly, these awkward interpretations are contested. For example, in 1994, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 940 to justify an international military mission to Haiti under its Chapter VII powers, citing fears that the civil conflict in Haiti threatened the region’s peace and security. In fact, Haiti’s problems were specific to its own politics and history and were unlikely to cross its borders. The U.N. intervention was opposed by many Latin American countries and led to the charge that the real motive was not humanitarian but political – namely, to restore democracy and the rule of Jean-Baptiste Aristide.

8 Another way of creating moral grounds for intervention arises when the U.N. is already participating in the settlement of a civil war or is somehow involved in the region. Multilateral humanitarian action by a coalition of states without Security Council sanction in these conditions seems more plausible. There have been multilateral military interventions outside the U.N. Charter when, for example, the 1995 Serbian massacre of some 7,000 Muslim males in the supposed U.N. “safe haven” of Srebrenica gave rise to NATO’s role in Bosnia. This led to Washington’s coercive diplomacy that hammered out the Dayton agreement.

9 The fiction is that an internal human rights crisis may spill over a nation’s borders and pose a threat to regional peace and security. But the “breach of regional peace” fiction doesn’t easily apply to a human rights crisis in a remote part of island nation that has little impact on its neighboring nation states. For example, when in 1999 rampaging Indonesian militiamen were slaughtering East Timorese by the hundreds, this human rights crisis did very little to threaten the peace or security of any other country in the region. In the absence of grounds for a Chapter VII intervention, even more creativity was called for. U.N. Secretary General Annan issued a statement that senior Indonesian officials risked prosecution for crimes against humanity if they did not consent to the deployment of an available multinational force.

10 Annan insisted that the Indonesian government either stop the killing itself or consent to the deployment of international troops, threatening that failure would result in Indonesians being held criminally liable for human rights violations.

11 The humanitarian intervention in East Timor has given rise to what has been termed the “Annan Doctrine”: the loss of the traditional prerogatives of sovereignty in the face of crimes against humanity.

12 Some scholars argue that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits any military intervention in other states on the grounds of purely internal violations of human rights.

13 Others argue instead that the recent humanitarian interventions that have occurred with a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) resolution under Chapter VII have created a de facto exception to Article 2(4).

14 Still others argue that humanitarian intervention may be morally justified, albeit not legally justified, without a foral UNSC Resolution. In such cases, some other record of the UNSC’s condemnation of the target country’s human rights record is sufficient, and the lack of any formal UNSC Resolution simply reflects international politics rather than any lack of genuine humanitarian concern. This occurred in relation to the 1999 NATO attack of Serbia that successfully rescued the Albanian Kosovars from Serbian ethnic cleansing. NATO acted because the U.N. could not. Richard Goldstone, chair of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, concluded that even though the Kosovo intervention did not have the backing of a Security Council resolution, it was never the less a legitimate intervention. NATO’s actions had resolved a humanitarian crisis and had widespread support within the international community and civil society.

15 Furthermore, the Commission argued that the gap between legal and legitimate humanitarian interventions is dangerous and needs to be removed by specifying the conditions for humanitarian intervention.16 In other words, what matters more than a legal permission to intervene is a moral permission to intervene. This moral permission legitimates the intervention, even though it cannot render the intervention fully legal under the terms of the U.N. Charter. The legal constraints upon international humanitarian intervention are out of step with the moral urge to prevent loss of life in a nation with a humanitarian crisis. These efforts to fit humanitarian intervention into the existing international legal apparatus are fictions, crafted so that international action may follow international moral opprobrium. They are more honestly a simple judgment by the international community that a nation’s government has failed its citizens. I want to suggest that the “Annan doctrine” deployed in East Timor is the way ahead. It shows the sovereign – here, the Indonesian — government bargaining directly with the international community through the U.N. over human rights standards and trading some of the traditional prerogatives of sovereignty for freedom from international criminal prosecution. In this way, the sovereign answers not only to its own citizens for its failures of responsibility, but answers also to the international community. The stakes of the negotiation are sovereignty. Sovereignty is not only a duty of government to protect the human rights of its citizens, but a bargaining chip in international humanitarian intervention with the international community acting on behalf of a nation’s citizens.

16. Relational Sovereignty In the twentieth century the view was that national sovereignty applied universally to all nations with a seat at the United Nations table, but that it did not impose a practical requirement to assist people in need in other lands. It suggested that we need not be morally troubled that other people may need our care. Under the 20th century metric, international sovereignty was a “thin” responsibility–at heart, merely a duty or obligation each state owes to all others to observe national borders.

17 Sovereignty today is best understood as vastly more complex. Economic interdependence between nation states has grown, accelerating with the end of the Cold War, the expansion of the European Union and the growing influence of the World Trade Organization and the World Bank.

18 More subtly, the proliferation of regional and international organizations has led to a diffusion of state influence beyond their sovereign borders.

19 This distribution is uneven, and often unjust. Even so, globalization has blurred the distinction between domestic politics and international politics.

20 What was once seen as a parochial national issue may now become a matter of regional or international concern.

21 This growing transnational awareness of the plight of another nation’s people has in part been the product of the last decade’s expansion of human rights as an international rhetoric of demand aimed at governments by citizens and outsiders alike– a rhetoric that is simultaneously being elaborated in international human rights treaties. Much of the human rights rhetoric, as well as many international human rights treaties, are a “wish list” that go far beyond a nation’s capacity or political will to fulfill. Even so, new global and international communities are judging national compliance with international human rights. The United Nations, regional systems like the European Union and the Inter-American systems, and myriad non-governmental organizations, have both direct and indirect input into human rights issues today.

22 Claims that states have violated their citizens’ human rights, either overtly or simply by mal-distributing essential goods in exigent circumstances, come from sources both inside and outside the state. Ever-expanding economic, cultural, and intellectual interdependencies between states, and between the citizens of states, are forging tenuous bonds of interest and concern among the citizens of different states. Do these bonds –much more tenuous than the bonds of shared citizenship of a state, and contingent upon international communication – amount to a moral relationship that crosses state borders? And if they do, how should it influence the moral calculus about coercive interventions in a state’s human rights abuses of its citizens? Relational sovereignty proposes that sovereignty today is dependent on the measure of care by government for its citizens, and that the international community may step in to militarily enforce this care. Sovereignty, in other words, carries a more expansive definition than it used to. Relational sovereignty describes sovereignty as an emerging set of obligations among citizens, governments, and the international community, with two dimensions. The first is a duty upon governments that correlates with the activities of their citizens, even if those activities extend beyond the nation’s borders. For example, the activities of the U.S. government extend beyond the borders of the U.S., not only because of U.S. military and economic interests, but also because U.S. citizens have myriad capital, corporate, professional, and recreational interests and activities beyond U.S. borders. Second, relational sovereignty describes the interest that one country may have in the quality of governance in another country. For example, the nations of the European Union have an interest in the quality of governance of nations applying to join the Union, and an improving human rights record is an important chunk of the accession process. In other words, sovereignty is a qualitative function rather than an unconditional status, and a function that may be assessed by citizens and the international community alike. A nation’s claim to sovereignty – the sort of strong claim that under the traditional definition of sovereignty would have kept other nations at bay and outside the borders – will not necessarily be recognized by other nations. This is especially so if a government is creating a human rights crisis. Relational sovereignty places such interactive judgments at the center rather than the periphery of responsible governance.

23 Relational sovereignty can be applied to humanitarian intervention. International peacekeeping activities of the last decade have emphasized the growing role of international human rights norms when considering the need to override sovereignty to protect a nation’s citizens. In 1999, the U.N. Security Council’s resolution authorizing the intervention of international peacekeeping in Kosovo referred to the resolution of “the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo.”

24 And more recently in 2004, Kofi Annan urged the U.N. Security Council to take action in the Darfur region of Sudan, citing “strong indications that war crimes and crimes against humanity have occurred…on a large and systematic scale”.

25 When national sovereignty is seen as a normative standard that is conditioned upon a government’s good human rights performance, this decade’s peacekeeping and humanitarian missions create a new principle for humanitarian intervention. National sovereignty will not deter the international community when a state is committing human rights abuses. National governments must discharge their duty of care towards their citizens, and the “court” of international opinion passes judgment. The international community acts as proxy for a state’s citizens in judging its care for them. If the sovereign fails to treat its citizens, and by that government’s own standards, the social contract between the ruler and the ruled collapses, an assessment of the government’s failings becomes a tripartite negotiation between sovereign, citizens, and the international community.

Three Principles Limiting International Humanitarian Intervention Widespread recognition exists that the U.N. Charter is out of step with contemporary international conditions. The 2004 U.N Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

26 emphasized the inter-connectedness of terrorism, civil wars, and extreme poverty. In welcoming the Panel’s report, Kofi Annan enthused about the “opportunity to refashion and renew our institutions,” including a more systematic and effective mechanism for intervention in humanitarian crises. In meantime, while this reform process takes place, the gap between legal and legitimate justifications for interventions in humanitarian crises should be closed. In a world of complete justice, no government would ever seriously harm its citizens, either directly through violence or indirectly through incompetence, corruption, or mal-distribution of social and economic goods. But the extreme step of military intervention needs to meet an extremely high standard of clear need, even more so if intervention does not fit Chapter VII conditions of threatening regional peace and security. I want to offer the legal principle of equity as a way of justifying and containing the new global awareness of harm a state does to its citizens, pending full recognition of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention under the theory of Relational Sovereignty. Equitable principles can balance the benefits and the dangers of humanitarian intervention. Equity has its historical foundation in both morality and law. When in the early days of modern courts the letter of the law failed to provide a remedy for deserving plaintiffs, judges used their discretion to grant a remedy “in equity.” Without a statute to guide them, judges have created the “common law” by articulating equitable principles that are so taken-for-granted that they do not need the authority of constitutions or legislation. The common law has in this way created fundamental legal principles that courts have elaborated over the years. These principles of equity have become the fail-safe of courts that seek to see that justice is done. In these situations, “equity intervenes when there is no adequate remedy at law.”

27 Courts fall back to equitable remedies in order to “provide fairness in a particular case of law.”

28 In other words, equity allows a court to fill the gaps of formal laws so that justice and fairness may prevail. Equitable principles are already part of international law, and have been applied in international judicial decision-making to ensure justice and fairness to the state parties. For example, the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists general principles of law recognized by civilized countries as one of the four sources of law,

29 and the Court assumes that it is always entitled to have recourse the use of equity. Equity, states the Court, is “implicit in the functions of a world tribunal.”

30 One recent example is the Court’s decision in the case about the Israel-Palestine wall. The Court directly cited equitable remedies, with all of the opinions referring to the “basic fairness” to the people of both territories and Judge Owada stating: Consideration of fairness in the administration of justice requires equitable treatment of the positions of both sides involved in the subject-matter in terms of the assessment both of facts and of law.

31 Equity should provide relief when the lives of innocent civilians are at risk. Judge Odwada said: Condemnation of the tragic circle of indiscriminate mutual violence perpetrated by both sides against innocent civilian population should be an important segment of the Opinion of the Court.

32 My argument here is that equitable principles and equitable doctrines can be applied to sovereignty, describing the duties of government towards its citizens and constraining intervention by the international community. Using equity and an analogy to principles of interpersonal rescue under traditional tort law, I suggest three threshold conditions for intervention. Such intervention should be limited to very rare cases, and should carry three threshold conditions. The first condition is that the humanitarian crisis must be widespread and extreme for intervention to be justified. This test already de facto exists in international law and has been applied over the last decade to interventions in genocide and widespread civil murder and mayhem.

33 I argue that this test should also apply to interventions that seek to alleviate mass starvation and disease. The crucial element for both types of widespread harm is the culpability of the national government in either causing or allowing such harm. The second threshold condition is that intervention must be welcomed by a firm consensus of injured citizens within the ailing state. Of course, this test is difficult to establish because it requires an ex ante assessment of popular support for intervention. It is easy to assume popular support for intervention when there is some reliable institutional litmus of public sentiment, as when in 1999 the U.N. intervened in the East Timor mayhem, after the overwhelming “yes” vote of the East Timorese referendum seeking secession from Indonesia. But such clear evidence is usually not available because oppressive governments rarely allow institutional expressions of unpopular sentiment about them. Finally, the third threshold test requires that international intervention do some good, and at very least, do no harm. This is also hard to establish: it requires excellent information about the politics, the capacity, and the popular preferences of the country where intervention might take place, and this information must point to the strong likelihood that intervention can improve conditions in the recipient country. If these three conditions are not in place, then intervention is unlikely to produce improved human rights. When they are, intervention can rightly be seen as an urgent expression of assistance to another nation’s people in need. Improving respect for human rights is the raison d’être of humanitarian intervention.

Threshold Test 1: Conditions must be extreme and widespread International law holds that a nation’s absolute sovereignty is sacrosanct and should be respected by other states. Despite this, military intervention, either multilateral or unilateral, has been justified under international law in the last decade where civil conflict was causing death or physical harm to innocents. But whereas intervention has been a measure of last resort in halting civil conflict, military intervention has not been justified in other situations of widespread death to innocents, such as terrible malnutrition, starvation and disease, even when those terrible circumstances have arisen from a government’s culpable inaction.

34 The international community typically intervenes in such cases by sending economic aid, both immediate aid with food and personnel, and longer-term economic aid for building a country’s infrastructure. Yet corruptly-governed countries, even those with very low internal revenues, still resist international economic incentives to prevent malnutrition and disease through better distribution of scarce social goods. Zimbabwe, for example, has high rates of government corruption and high rates of infant mortality and death from disease, including HIV-Aids. It has widespread poverty caused by its government.

At the same time, Zimbabwe is resistant to international pressure to reform its politics. For countries that lie beyond indirect international influence, is there another way to incentivize their governments to distribute social goods more equally among their citizens?

Where a Chapter VII intervention on the grounds or regional peace and security is not justified, and international economic incentives are not reducing the death toll, should there be an alternative rationale for forced intervention in a government’s harm to its citizens? One approach could be to revisit the justifications for military humanitarian intervention and ask: is there a philosophical difference between intervention for genocide and intervention for mass malnutrition and starvation caused by corrupt or negligent governance? Why should a slow death through starvation be categorically different from a swift death by machete? The total numbers of deaths of citizens doesn’t distinguish the cases, nor does the pain and anguish experienced by their victims. If it is accepted that the philosophical rationale for humanitarian intervention is the international community’s interest in protecting the suffering citizens of a nation, surely this should equally apply to death delivered by degrees over weeks and months. Equity looks to the moral culpability of a party for the harm of a victim. The test is justice and fairness, not just sovereignty. The key justification for international humanitarian intervention should be a government’s culpability in causing, or failing to prevent, the widespread death of innocents, rather than the method of causing those deaths. The test of widespread harm has already emerged for international intervention in civil carnage.

For example, after the civil and political crises in Rwanda and Kosovo, Kofi Annan stated that military intervention could be legitimate if there is an acute human rights crisis and if all diplomatic efforts have failed. Annan’s test could be read to mean that military invention may also be justified for widespread starvation through a government’s negligent or intentional failure to distribute minimally necessary goods and essential sustenance. Governments that fail miserably in their duty to ensure their populations’ well-being, either through bad intentions or through corruption or negligence, are surely failing in the obligations of the sovereign to care for its citizens. States which have no capacity – commonly referred to as “failed states” – are outside this first threshold test because their government is not the direct cause of the conditions causing death. The crucial element here is a government’s capacity to help its citizens. There is no moral difference between deaths caused by a government’s failure to keep the peace and deaths caused by a greedy government’s failure to distribute social and economic goods among all its population.

There is little practical difference either: recent studies have shown that the perception that intervention in civil war is straightforward is simply wrong – intervention is always complicated, and its success or failure depends much more upon long-term support than it does on the initial justification for intervention. Death by civil violence and death by corruption or neglect should be treated equivalently, equally justifying military humanitarian intervention if the harms are as equally widespread.35 Applying this to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, a true humanitarian intervention would have depended upon more widespread harm – harm that was felt across all ethnic groups and not concentrated in one region. This threshold test would therefore rule out humanitarian intervention in Iraq because human rights abuses there, though extreme in some cases, were not as widespread as either mass starvation or large-scale ethnic cleansing. Threshold test 2: intervention must be welcomed by the victims The common law does not demand that an individual accept help from a bystander. The law of equity has applied this in the area of medical assistance, crafting the equitable doctrine of self-determination. This is defined as “one’s ability to exert autonomy over one’s own person, which includes the right to prevent unwanted bodily invasion and, therefore, the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.”

36 As long as a person has the rational ability of an adult, he may refuse medical treatment. Applying this principle to international military intervention, equity suggests that just as people may refuse medical intervention, citizens also may make a political choice not to be saved from their sovereign’s tyranny. In other words, international intervention must only take place if the beleaguered citizens of a nation state wish it. Using East Timor as an example, I want to suggest that this idea of consent is already forming de facto in the international system. From 1975 to 1999, there had been active resistance among the East Timorese people to Indonesian rule – resistance that was regularly reported in the international press and was a subject of heated diplomacy between Indonesia and other nations. When the 1999 referendum in East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia, the U.N.’s decision to send troops to stop civilian murder was easy. The East Timorese had expressed a clear mandate for the U.N. to step in on their behalf. But in many cases of widespread civil unrest or widespread starvation and disease, there is no such unambiguous expression of the popular will as there was in East Timor. What information can the international community rely upon? Even more problematically, what are the moral obligations of the international community if it seems that a population consents to its own violation? Equity is a guide here. Sometimes, an individual’s refusal of medical treatment may be overridden where there are other interests, such as the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties, and the integrity of medical ethics. But the courts are extremely cautious about stepping over apparent consent to self-harm. For example, in Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. at 580, a 1988 decision of the US District Court of Rhode Island, the court stated: Although Marcia Gray has a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, no right is absolute…Accordingly, Marcia Gray’s right must be balanced against competing governmental interests that include: the preservation of life, the prevention of suicide, the protection of innocent third parties, and the integrity of medical ethics…Upon examination, Marcia Gray’s interest in self-determination outweighs all governmental interests.

37 Marcia Gray had the right to make a self-harming decision in refusing food and hydration. The same question needs to be asked about a nation’s people who seem to be acquiescing in their own government’s harm or neglect. The equitable doctrine of self-determination can either act as a brake on intervention by imputing to citizens their preference to suffer under a corrupt or violent government rather than have outsiders come in and impose solutions, or it might act as a justification for intervention by imputing that citizens could not possibly consent to the degree of extreme and widespread harm in their country. The second threshold test will also be hard to satisfy in most cases as most corrupt or authoritarian governments do not take the pulse of their citizens’ feelings. Absent a referendum such as in East Timor, there must be clear evidence of such a groundswell of popular opinion that there is likely to be very little insurgent reaction against international intervention and very high levels of co-operation with those intervening forces in the days and weeks following invasion. Applying this to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, would have called for better empirical knowledge of the human rights conditions in Iraq, and would have meant taking seriously those provisions in the 1991 Security Council resolutions that referred to human rights by, for example, sending human rights monitors as well as weapons inspectors to Iraq. Anything less than East Timor’s expressions of popular will must be viewed with extreme caution. Intervention must be informed by opinions of people currently living under a repressive government and not only the veins of a vocal diaspora of past inhabitants.

Threshold test 3: the intervention must produce more good than harm Finally, the third threshold test requires that international intervention ought only take place where it will do good, and at the very least, do no overall harm. Returning to the individual rescue analogy, equity does not require a bystander to be a Good Samaritan and help another in distress. But if bystanders choose to intervene, two conditions apply: first, they must intend to help the victim; and second, at very least they must not do harm. If the bystander causes more harm to the victim, it raises the question of misfeasance or bad intent on the part of the bystander. Applying equity to international law, humanitarian intervention into another nation’s human rights crisis ought to bring an improvement, and at the very least, must not make the human rights situation worse. If conditions worsen, the Good Samaritan has not been so good after all. Equity emphasizes two things: first, that humanitarian motivations must seek predominantly to help the people of another nation and not to pursue other geopolitical agendas; and second, intervention must improve, or at very least not worsen, conditions for the citizenry.

Like Threshold Test 2, this makes intervention harder and not easier to justify. Improvement in conditions for citizens in the recipient country must be substantial, and not likely to be outweighed by harms that may come from insurgent resistance to the international forces. Improvements in living conditions must occur immediately, instantly providing relief from ghastly circumstances. And the intervention must also demonstrate the likelihood of long-term improvements, such as improved governance and better distributive mechanisms for social and economic goods. How might this last threshold test operate? The United States’ unilateral invasion of Iraq fails the Good Samaritan test because not only were weapons of mass destructions not found, but the invasion came at a huge cost of lives for the Iraqi people, with some 25,000 Iraqi civilians killed in the first two years. Given the relative size of the two countries, this number of civilian deaths would be the equivalent of roughly 300,000 American deaths. The application of an international Good Samaritan doctrine would seek to limit the harm within Iraq. An acceptable alternative might have been to deploy troops on the border to put pressure on the Iraqi regime to comply with the 1991 Security Council resolutions. The potential task of those troops would not have been invasion and regime change, but to protect civilians in the event that the government decided to crush an uprising, as happened, for example, in 1991. Under the equitable doctrine of the Good Samaritan, the U.S. invasion could be seen as misfeasance – the sin of commission.

5. Conclusion A couple of decades ago, neither the U.N. Security Council nor the governments of individual nations relied so heavily on issues like human rights, genocide, oppression and torture when justifying intervention in civil conflicts. This is changing. There is today an unprecedented awareness of the plight of people in other nations. Globalization has accelerated this debate through its focus on the role of governments in responding to international pressures for expanded human rights. This awareness has altered the expectations of sovereignty: the international community places an affirmative duty upon national governments not only to keep the peace, but to distribute minimal material goods sufficient to prevent starvation. Military humanitarian interventions of the last decades are invoking a moral language of international interest in the competence of domestic governments. International humanitarian intervention has become one way of expressing compassion for citizens who are too silenced, too sick, too hungry, or simply too neglected to demand more of their government. While death by government violence or civil war may seem a more shocking failure of a government’s duty of care to its peoples, in fact, widespread death through malnutrition or disease may render a negligent government equally culpable. The rationale for international intervention ought to apply to both active violence and passive death and disease. In both cases, the sovereign government has failed in its role to protect its people.

A murderous, corrupt or neglectful government’s failure to prevent the death or injury of its citizens amounts to a fracturing of sovereignty. This creates an opportunity – a moral permission rather than a legal obligation — for other nations to act as Good Samaritans. In these circumstances, the international community may provide a remedy to beleaguered citizens – a remedy that exists as a matter of equity rather than as a matter of law, and which may be the impetus for a Chapter VII intervention.

The test should be extreme and widespread harm, whether this comes from deadly civil mayhem or malnutrition and diseases. An equitable international right to intervene in the intentional governmental harm or negligent failure of a state to distribute public goods should arise when national sovereignty has been overtaken by a government’s action or inaction towards its people. It needs to be an overwhelmingly welcome intervention, with good ex ante evidence of internal support for exterior intervention. And it must be an intervention that improves the lives of citizens, and certainly does not make their life harder. For even when intervention is supported by a large majority of a population, history shows that some resistance and insurgency will likely cause further bloodshed and harm. For intervention to be justified, there must have been such extreme and widespread hardship in that country that the bloodshed of a forced international presence seems minor in comparison. Finally, humanitarian intervention is only justified if there is a long-term commitment to building something better in the place of what is destroyed. Helen Stacy is a lecturer at the Stanford Law School. She has published extensively on international and comparative law; the adversarial system of law; legal and social theory; and human rights. She is the author of Postmodernism and Law: Jurisprudence in a Fragmenting World, (Ashgate Press, 2001), which explores the impact of postmodernism on legal thinking and discusses how law can benefit from postmodern thought. Before coming to Stanford, Stacy was a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane, Australia. Before becoming a law professor, she practiced law as an industrial lawyer with Shell Oil Company in Australia, and then as a senior crown prosecutor in the United Kingdom as a member of the Inner Temple of the Inns of Court, where she prosecuted cases of murder, manslaughter, rape and terrorist acts. Endnotes 1 On the debate regarding humanitarian intervention and its status in current international law see, among others, A.P.V. Rogers, The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 725 (2004); Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections To Humanitarian Intervention, 19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1005 (1998); And Nikolai Krylov, Humanitarian Intervention: Pros and Cons, 17 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 365 (1995). 2 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 reads “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

3 U.N. Charter art. 51 reads “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

4 U.N. Charter art. 42 states: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”

5 I initially proposed the reconfiguration of relational sovereignty in Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 2029 (2003).

6 See id. at 2045-7.

7 On the matter of intervention in Somalia, see Security Council resolution S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992); On the matter of intervention in Rwanda see Security Council resolution S.C. Res. 929, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (1994); On the matter of intervention in Haiti see Security Council resolution S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 51, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1994); and on the matter of intervention in Bosnia see Security Council resolution S.C. Res. 770 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992) & S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993). 8 On the opposition of Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil (who was a member of the Security Council at the time) see the Security Council’s discussions for July 31st 1994, when representatives of Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela, among others, were invited to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, at S/PV. 3413 of 31 July 1994, pages 4 (Mexico), 5 (Cuba), 6 (Uruguay) and 8 (Venezuela & Brazil). 9 For more on the Bosnian atrocities and the Dayton Agreement see Elizabeth M. Cousens, Making Peace in Bosnia Work, 30 Cornell Int’l L.J. 789, 791-2 (1997). 10 .U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Press conference at the U.N. Headquarters on September 10, 1999. A transcript of this press conference, UNIS/SG/2360, is available at: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/1999/sg2360.html. 11 .Annan warned that if Jakarta refused to accept the international community’s assistance, it could not “escape the responsibility of what could amount . . . to crimes against humanity.” Id. Or, in the words of the Geneva Conventions, Indonesian leaders would be left open to international prosecution because they had not taken “all feasible measures” to stop the violence. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 12 . U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Speech to open the General Assembly on September 20, 1999, at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html. 13 Michael Akehurst, Humanitarian Intervention, in Intervention In World Politics, 99 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984); Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion And Intervention On The Grounds Of Humanity (Dordrecht, 1985). Ian Brownlie, International Law And The Use Of Force By States (Oxford, 1963); Lori F. Damrosch, Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce Human Rights, in Law and Force in the New International Order 215, 217-21 (Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffler eds., 1991); Louis Henkin, The Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force 37, 41-44 (Louis Henkin et al., 2d ed. 1991). 14 John Norton Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 American Journal Of International Law 145, 154-55; Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 American Journal Of International Law 866, 869 (1990); Celeste Poltak, Humanitarian Intervention: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations, 60 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1 (2002); For more on the veto system, as preventing humanitarian intervention see: Jules Lobel, American Hegemony and International Law: Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 19, 2000. 15 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, (Oxford University Press, 2000). 16 Id. 17 This conception of sovereignty extended to both internal and external relations: a state exercises extensive control over its people within its territory, but at the same time it must respect the authority of other states within their territorial borders. This is a ‘thin’ conception, as it concentrates on the state’s right to govern its citizens, and not on the state’s responsibilities towards its citizens. For more on this see Jonathan H. Marks, Mending the Web: Universal Jurisdiction, Humanitarian Intervention and the Abrogation of Immunity by the Security Council, 42 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 445, 477 (2003). 18 Stanley Hoffmann, The Ethics And Politics Of Humanitarian Intervention, 12-13 (University of Notre Dame Press, 1996). 19 Id. at 15. 20 For more about the erosion of sovereignty due to economic and technological developments see John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 A.J.I.L. 782, 785 (2003). 21 An example for such occurrence can be found in the case of East Timor. East Timor declared its independence from Portuguese colonization on 28 November 1975. Nine days later it was invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces, killing 60,000 Timorese in the initial assault. At the time, the international community did not initiate any actions targeted at the protection of the Timorese people. More than 20 years later, on 30 August 1999, in a U.N.-supervised popular referendum, an overwhelming majority of the people of East Timor (78.5%) voted for independence from Indonesia. By this time, the region’s aspirations for independence were the focus of the United Nations, which agreed to send a multinational peacekeeping force to the region in the pre-referendum phase, at the request of Indonesia. Soon after the referendum, anti-independence Timorese militias – organized and supported by the Indonesian military – commenced a large-scale, scorched-earth campaign of retribution against the East Timorese. On 20 September 1999 the Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) deployed to the country and brought the violence to an end. On 20 May 2002, East Timor was internationally recognized as an independent state. 22 For a historical account of the globalization of human rights see Herbert V. Morais, The Globalization Of Human Rights Law And The Role Of International Financial Institutions In Promoting Human Rights, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 71, 2000. For more on the involvement of the EU in this process see Diego J. Linan Nogueras & Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez, Human Rights Conditionality in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy Problems, 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 307, (2001). 23 A similar idea was expressed by Fernando R. Teson, at Forthcoming in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, editors., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003); see also Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Transnational Publishers Inc., 1997). 24 See .S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999). 25 Emily Wax, Sudanese getting little help U.N. estimates death toll has nearly doubled to 70,000 since Sept. 9, The Washington Post, November 17, 2004, at A10. 26 The U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, established the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, in November 2003, in order to examine new dangers to international security and to recommend ways of strengthening institutions of collective security. For more on the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change see: http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/panel.asp . 27 Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity And Contemporary Procedure, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 429, 476-78 (2003). 28 Jack Moser, ESSAY: THE SECULARIZATION OF EQUITY: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal Christian Influences, And Medieval Authoritarian Impacts On The Evolution Of Legal Equitable Remedies, 26 Cap. U.L. Rev. 483, 486 (1997). 29 The other three sources are: (1) international covenants; (2) international custom; and (4) judicial decisions of various nations. See art. 38, para. 1. 30 See General Information about ICJ: http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookchapter7.HTM. 31 For the separate opinion of Judge Owada, see theICJ website at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm 32 For the separate opinion of Judge Owada, see theICJ website, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm. 33 The requirement of an extreme and widespread humanitarian crisis, as a just condition for humanitarian intervention, has also appeared in the work of others. See Michael Walzer, Just And Unjust Wars 108 (Basic Books Inc. 1977); Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law And Morality, (Transnational Publishers Inc., 1997). 34 Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law And Morality 117, 123-5 (Transnational Publishers Inc., 1997). 35 Here, I am utilizing the distinction between civil and political rights as they are expressed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and social and economic rights as they are expressed in the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. 36 See Kristin M. Lomond, Note: An Adult Patient’s Right To Refuse Medical Treatment For Religious Reasons: The Limitations Imposed By Parenthood 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 665, 670 (1993). 37 Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. at 580. အဆံုးအထိဆက္ဖတ္ရန္ ၿပန္ေခါက္ထားခဲ့ေလ….

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Save us the rescuers

Save us the rescuers

Calls for military action to force aid on Myanmar

march us down a dangerous road, that we are willing to accept

By David Rieff May 18, 2008

Sorry, Mr David Rieff we disagree with you and I erased ‘From’ your heading. And I added the pharase, ‘that we are willing to accept’, at the end of your subheading.

The decision by the government of Myanmar not to admit foreign humanitarian relief workers to help the victims of Cyclone Nargis has been met with fury, consternation and disbelief in much of the world.

  • With tens of thousands of people dead,
  • up to 100,000 missing
  • and more than a million displaced
  • and without shelter, livelihood or possibly even sufficient food,
  • the refusal of the military rulers of the country to let in foreign aid organizations or to open airports and waterways in more than a token way to shipments of aid supplies
  • seems to be an act of sheer barbarism.

In response, Gareth Evans, the former Australian foreign minister who heads the International Crisis Group, made the case last week that_

  1. the decision by Myanmar’s authorities to default on their responsibilities to their own citizens might well constitute “a crime against humanity,”
  2. and suggested that the United Nations might need to consider bringing aid to Myanmar non-consensually,
  3. justified on the basis of the “Responsibility to Protect Resolution”
  4. adopted at the 2005 U.N. World Summit by 150 member states.

To be sure, R2P (as the resolution is colloquially known) was not envisaged by the commission that framed it (and that Evans co-chaired) as a response to natural disasters, but rather as a way of confronting “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”

To extend its jurisdiction to natural disasters is as unprecedented as it is radical. But as Evans put it last week, “when a government default is as grave as the course on which [Myanmar’s] generals now seem to be set, there is at least a prima facie case to answer for their intransigence being a crime against humanity — of a kind that would attract the responsibility-to-protect principle.”

  • Evans’ warning was clear. Myanmar’s generals should not delude themselves into thinking that the international community would allow them to act in any way they wished
  • not if it meant turning a blind eye to the dangers the cyclone’s survivors faced.
  • These dangers, according to the British charity Oxfam, threatened an additional 1.5 million lives.

And a number of European governments took the same line.

  1. British Foreign Secretary David Miliband stated that military action to ensure that the aid got to where it needed to go might be legal and necessary.
  2. And French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner echoed this argument, saying that France was considering bringing a resolution to the U.N. Security Council allowing for such steps to be taken.

For Kouchner, a co-founder of the French relief group Doctors Without Borders, this was familiar ground. He was a leading, and controversial, figure in the relief world long before joining Nicolas Sarkozy’s government last year,

  • and he is one of the originators of the so-called right of interference
  • a hawkish interpretation of humanitarianism’s moral imperative
  • and an operational license that basically held that outside aid groups and governments had a presumptive right to intervene when governments abused their own people.

At first glance, the arguments of Evans, Miliband, Kouchner and the leaders of many mainstream relief organizations may seem like common-sense humanism.

  1. How could it be morally acceptable to subordinate the rights of people in need to the prerogatives of national sovereignty?
  2. In a globalized world in which people, goods and money all move increasingly freely,
  3. why should a national borderthat relic of the increasingly unimportant state system — stand in the way of people dedicated to doing good for their fellow human beings?
  4. Why should the world stand by and allow an abusive government to continue to be derelict in its duties toward its own people?

Surely, to oppose this sort of humanitarian entitlement is a failure of empathy and perhaps even an act of moral cowardice.

This has been the master narrative of the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.

It has dominated the speeches of officials and most of the media coverage,

which has been imbued with an almost pornographic catastrophism in which aid agencies and journalists seem to be trying to outdo each other in the apocalyptic quality of their predictions.

I hope that the author ended here. But we sadly see the communist/socialistic views of the author, who do not know the sufferings of Burmese citizens. We know about the SPDC than you!

(Comment: unfair counter accusation: First, the U.S. charge d’affaires in Yangon, Myanmar’s capital, without having left the city, told reporters that though only 22,000 people had been confirmed dead, she thought the toll could rise as high as 100,000. A few days later, Oxfam was out with its estimate of 1.5 million people being at risk from water-borne diseases — without ever explaining how it arrived at such an extraordinarily alarming estimate.In reality, no one yet knows what the death toll from the cyclone is, let alone how resilient the survivors will be. One thing is known, however, and that is that in crisis after crisis, from the refugee emergency in eastern Zaire after the Rwandan genocide, through the Kosovo crisis, to the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, to the 2004 South Asian tsunami, many of the leading aid agencies, Oxfam prominent among them, have predicted far more casualties than there would later turn out to have been. In part, this is because relief work is, in a sense, a business, and humanitarian charities are competing with every other sort of philanthropic cause for the charitable dollar and euro, and thus have to exaggerate to be noticed. It is also because coping with disasters for a living simply makes the worst-case scenario always seem the most credible one, and, honorably enough, relief workers feel they must always be prepared for the worst. But whatever the motivations, it is really no longer possible to take the relief community’s apocalyptic claims seriously. It has wrongly cried wolf too many times.We should be skeptical of the aid agencies’ claims that, without their intervention, an earthquake or cyclone will be followed by an additional disaster of equal scope because of disease and hunger. The fact is that populations in disaster zones tend to be much more resilient than foreign aid groups often make them out to be. And though the claim that only they can prevent a second catastrophe is unprovable, it serves the agencies’ institutional interests — such interventions are, after all, the reason they exist in the first place.)

Unwelcome as the thought may be, reasonable-sounding suggestions made in the name of global solidarity and humanitarian compassion can sometimes be nothing of the sort. Aid is one thing. But aid at the point of a gun is taking the humanitarian enterprise to a place it should never go. And the fact that the calls for humanitarian war were ringing out within days of Cyclone Nargis is emblematic of how the interventionist impulse, no matter how well-intended, is extremely dangerous.

The ease with which the rhetoric of rescue slips into the rhetoric of war is why invoking R2P should never be accepted simply as an effort to inject some humanity into an inhumane situation (the possibility of getting the facts wrong is another reason; that too has happened in the past).

Yes, the impulse of the interveners may be entirely based on humanitarian and human rights concerns. But lest we forget, the motivations of 19th century European colonialism were also presented by supporters as being grounded in humanitarian concern. And this was not just hypocrisy. We must not be so politically correct as to deny the humanitarian dimension of imperialism. But we must also not be so historically deaf, dumb and blind as to convince ourselves that it was its principal dimension.

Lastly, it is critically important to pay attention to just who is talking about military intervention on humanitarian grounds. Well, among others, it’s the foreign ministers of the two great 19th century colonial empires. And where exactly do they want to intervene — sorry, where do they want to live up to their responsibility to protect? Mostly in the very countries they used to rule.

When a British or French minister proposes a U.N. resolution calling for a military intervention to make sure aid is properly delivered in the Lower 9th Ward of New Orleans, then, and only then, can we be sure we have put the specter of imperialism dressed up as humanitarianism behind us. In the meantime, buyer beware.

David Rieff is the author of many books, including “At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention” and “A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis.”

See also

Now or Never! NCGUB should invite NATO to invade Irrawaddy delta

 

NATO should not practice: No Action Talk Only in Burma

NATO should not practice:

No Action Talk Only in Burma

NATO

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Coordinates: 50°52′34.16″N, 4°25′19.24″E

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Organization du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord
Flag of NATO
Flag of NATO
NATO countries shown in blue
NATO countries shown in blue
Formation 4 April 1949
Type Military alliance
Headquarters Brussels, Belgium
Membership 26 member states and 14 major allies
Official languages English, French
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
Chairman of the Military Committee General Raymond Henault
Website http://www.nato.int/
NATO Portal

NATO 2002 Summit in Prague. NATO 2002 Summit in Prague.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); French: Organization du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN); (also called the North Atlantic Alliance, the Atlantic Alliance, or the Western Alliance) is a military alliance established by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, the organization constitutes a system of collective defense whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party.

For its first few years, NATO was not much more than a political association. However the Korean War galvanised the member states, and an integrated military structure was build up under the direction of two U.S. supreme commanders. Thoughout the Cold War doubts over the strength of the relationship between the European states and the United States ebbed and flowed, along with doubts over the credibility of the NATO defence against a prospective Soviet invasion. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the organisation became drawn into the Balkans while building better links with former potential enemies to the east, which culminated with three former Warsaw Pact states joining the alliance in 1999. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks NATO has attempted to refocus itself to new challenges and has deployed troops to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Contents

  • 1 History of NATO
    • 1.1 Beginnings
    • 1.2 Détente
    • 1.3 KAL 007 and NATO deployment of missiles in W. Europe
    • 1.4 Post Cold War
    • 1.5 After the September 11 attacks
    • 1.6 Expansion and restructuring
    • 1.7 Involvement in Afghanistan: Taking over ISAF
    • 1.8 NATO missile defence talks controversy
  • 2 Membership
    • 2.1 Future enlargement of NATO
  • 3 Cooperation with non-member states
    • 3.1 Euro-Atlantic Partnership
    • 3.2 Individual Partnership Action Plans
  • 4 Structures
    • 4.1 Political structure
      • 4.1.1 List of officials
    • 4.2 Military structure
    • 4.3 Organisations and Agencies
  • 5 References
  • 6 Further reading
  • 7 External links

 

History of NATO

 

Beginnings

The Treaty of Brussels, signed on 17 March 1948 by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom is considered the precursor to the NATO agreement. The treaty and the Soviet Berlin Blockade led to the creation of the Western European Union’s Defence Organisation in September 1948.However, participation of the United States was thought necessary in order to counter the military power of the Soviet Union, and therefore talks for a new military alliance began almost immediately.

These talks resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington, D.C. on 4 April 1949. It included the five Treaty of Brussels states, as well as the United States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. Support for the Treaty was not unanimous; Iceland suffered an anti-NATO riot in March 1949 which may have been Communist-inspired. Three years later, on 18 February 1952, Greece and Turkey also joined.

The Parties of NATO agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. Consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense will assist the Party or Parties being attacked, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force” does not necessarily mean that other member states will respond with military action against the aggressor(s). Rather they are obliged to respond, but maintain the freedom to choose how they will respond. This differs from Article IV of the Treaty of Brussels (which founded the Western European Union) which clearly states that the response must include military action. It is however often assumed that NATO members will aid the attacked member militarily. Further, the article limits the organization’s scope to Europe and North America, which explains why the invasion of the British Falkland Islands did not result in NATO involvement.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was crucial for NATO as it raised the apparent threat level greatly (all Communist countries were suspected of working together) and forced the alliance to develop concrete military plans. The 1952 Lisbon conference, seeking to provide the forces necessary for NATO’s Long-Term Defence Plan, called for an expansion to 96 divisions. However this requirement was dropped the following year to roughly 35 divisions with heavier use to be made of nuclear weapons. Also at Lisbon, the post of Secretary General of NATO as the organisation’s chief civilian was also created, and Baron Hastings Ismay eventually appointed to the post. Later, in September 1952, the first major NATO maritime exercises began; Operation Mainbrace brought together 200 ships and over 50,000 personnel to practice the defence of Denmark and Norway. Meanwhile, while this overt military preparation was going on, covert stay-behind arrangements to continue resistance after a successful Soviet invasion (‘Operation Gladio’), initially made by the Western European Union, were being transferred to NATO control. Ultimately unofficial bonds began to grow between NATO’s armed forces, such as the NATO Tiger Association and competitions such as the Canadian Army Trophy for tank gunnery.

In 1954, the Soviet Union suggested that it should join NATO to preserve peace in Europe. The NATO countries, fearing that the Soviet Union’s motive was to weaken the alliance, ultimately rejected this proposal.

The incorporation of West Germany into the organization on 9 May 1955 was described as “a decisive turning point in the history of our continent” by Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway at the time. Indeed, one of its immediate results was the creation of the Warsaw Pact, signed on 14 May 1955 by the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and East Germany, as a formal response to this event, thereby delineating the two opposing sides of the Cold War.

The unity of NATO was breached early on in its history, with a crisis occurring during Charles de Gaulle’s presidency of France from 1958 onward. De Gaulle protested the United States’ strong role in the organization and what he perceived as a special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. In a memorandum sent to President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on 17 September 1958, he argued for the creation of a tripartite directorate that would put France on an equal footing with the United States and the United Kingdom, and also for the expansion of NATO’s coverage to include geographical areas of interest to France, most notably Algeria, where France was waging a counter-insurgency and sought NATO assistance.

Considering the response given to be unsatisfactory, and in order to give France, in the event of a East German incursion into West Germany, the option of coming to a separate peace with the Eastern bloc instead of being drawn into a NATO-Warsaw Pact global war, de Gaulle began to build an independent defence for his country. On 11 March 1959, France withdrew its Mediterranean fleet from NATO command; three months later, in June 1959, de Gaulle banned the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on French soil. This caused the United States to transfer two hundred military aircraft out of France and return control of the ten major air force bases that had operated in France since 1950 to the French by 1967.

In the meantime, France had initiated an independent nuclear deterrence programme, spearheaded by the “Force de frappe” (“Striking force”). France tested its first nuclear weapon, Gerboise Bleue, on 13 February 1960, in (what was then) French Algeria.

Map of Major USAF bases in France before Charles de Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from NATO military integrated command. Map of Major USAF bases in France before Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 withdrawal from NATO military integrated command.

Though France showed solidarity with the rest of NATO during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, de Gaulle continued his pursuit of an independent defence by removing France’s Atlantic and Channel fleets from NATO command. In 1966, all French armed forces were removed from NATO’s integrated military command, and all non-French NATO troops were asked to leave France. This withdrawal forced the relocation of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) from Paris to Casteau, north of Mons, Belgium, by 16 October 1967. France remained a member of the alliance, and committed to the defence of Europe from possible Communist attack with its own forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany throughout this period. France rejoined NATO’s Military Committee in 1995, and has since intensified working relations with the military structure. France has not, however, rejoined the integrated military command and no non-French NATO troops are allowed to be based on its soil. The policies of current French President Nicolas Sarkozy appear to be aimed at eventual re-integration.

The creation of NATO brought about some standardisation of allied military terminology, procedures, and technology, which in many cases meant European countries adopting U.S. practices. The roughly 1300 Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) codifies the standardisation that NATO has achieved. Hence, the 7.62×51 NATO rifle cartridge was introduced in the 1950s as a standard firearm cartridge among many NATO countries. Fabrique Nationale’s FAL became the most popular 7.62 NATO rifle in Europe and served into the early 1990s. Also, aircraft marshalling signals were standardized, so that any NATO aircraft could land at any NATO base. Other standards such as the NATO phonetic alphabet have made their way beyond NATO into civilian use.

Détente

During most of the duration of the Cold War, NATO maintained a holding pattern with no actual military engagement as an organization. On 1 July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened for signature: NATO argued that its nuclear weapons sharing arrangements did not breach the treaty as U.S. forces controlled the weapons until a decision was made to go to war, at which point the treaty would no longer be controlling. Few states knew of the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements at that time, and they were not challenged.

On 30 May 1978, NATO countries officially defined two complementary aims of the Alliance, to maintain security and pursue détente. This was supposed to mean matching defences at the level rendered necessary by the Warsaw Pact’s offensive capabilities without spurring a further arms race.

On 12 December 1979, in light of a build-up of Warsaw Pact nuclear capabilities in Europe, ministers approved the deployment of U.S. GLCM cruise missiles and Pershing II theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. The new warheads were also meant to strengthen the western negotiating position in regard to nuclear disarmament. This policy was called the Dual Track policy. Similarly, in 1983-84, responding to the stationing of Warsaw Pact SS-20 medium-range missiles in Europe, NATO deployed modern Pershing II missiles tasked to hit military targets such as tank formations in the event of war. This action led to peace movement protests throughout Western Europe.

KAL 007 and NATO deployment of missiles in W. Europe

With the background of the build-up of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, NATO decided, under the impetus of the Reagan presidency, to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, primarily West Germany. These missiles were theatre nuclear weapons intended to strike targets on the battlefield if the Soviets invaded West Germany. Yet support for the deployment was wavering and many doubted whether the push for deployment could be sustained. But on Sept. 1, 1983, the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007, a Boeing 747 with 269 people aboard, in international waters just past the west coast of Sakhalin Island – an act which Reagan characterized as a “massacre”. The barbarity of this act, as the U.S. and indeed the world understood it, galvanized support for the deployment – which stood in place until the later accords between Reagan and Mikhael Gorbachev.

The membership of the organization in this time period likewise remained largely static. In 1974, as a consequence of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece withdrew its forces from NATO’s military command structure, but, with Turkish cooperation, were readmitted in 1980. On 30 May 1982, NATO gained a new member when, following a referendum, the newly democratic Spain joined the alliance.

In November 1983, NATO manoeuvres simulating a nuclear launch caused panic in the Kremlin. The Soviet leadership, led by ailing General Secretary Yuri Andropov, became concerned that the manoeuvres, codenamed Able Archer 83, were the beginnings of a genuine first strike. In response, Soviet nuclear forces were readied and air units in East Germany and Poland were placed on alert. Though at the time written off by U.S. intelligence as a propaganda effort, many historians now believe that the Soviet fear of a NATO first strike was genuine.

 

Post Cold War

The NATO Secretary General, the U.S. President, and the Prime Ministers of Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Estonia after a ceremony welcoming them into NATO on 29 March 2004 at the Istanbul Summit. The NATO Secretary General, the U.S. President, and the Prime Ministers of Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Estonia after a ceremony welcoming them into NATO on 29 March 2004 at the Istanbul Summit.

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 removed the de facto main adversary of NATO. This caused a strategic re-evaluation of NATO’s purpose, nature and tasks. In practice this ended up entailing a gradual (and still ongoing) expansion of NATO to Eastern Europe, as well as the extension of its activities to areas that had not formerly been NATO concerns. The first post-Cold War expansion of NATO came with the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990, when the former East Germany became part of the Federal Republic of Germany and the alliance. This had been agreed in the Two Plus Four Treaty earlier in the year. To secure Soviet approval of a united Germany remaining in NATO, it was agreed that foreign troops and nuclear weapons would not be stationed in the east. The scholar Stephen F. Cohen has argued that a commitment was given that NATO would never expand further east, but this appears to be a misperception; no formal commitment of the sort was made.

As part of post-Cold War restructuring, NATO’s military structure was cut back and reorganized, with new forces such as the Headquarters Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps established. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe agreed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and signed in Paris in 1990, mandated specific reductions. The changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union on the military balance in Europe were recognized in the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, signed some years later.

The first NATO military operation caused by the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was Operation Sharp Guard, which ran from June 1993-October 1996. It provided maritime enforcement of the arms embargo and economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 28 February 1994, NATO took its first military action, shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircraft violating a U.N.-mandated no-fly zone over central Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operation Deny Flight, the no-fly-zone enforcement mission, had begun a year before, on 12 April 1993, and was to continue until 20 December 1995. NATO air strikes that year helped bring the war in Bosnia to an end, resulting in the Dayton Agreement, which in turn meant that NATO deployed a peacekeeping force, under Operation Joint Endeavor, first named IFOR and then SFOR, which ran from December 1996 to December 2004. Following the lead of its member nations, NATO began to award a service medal, the NATO Medal, for these operations.

Between 1994 and 1997, wider forums for regional cooperation between NATO and its neighbours were set up, like the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. On 8 July 1997, three former communist countries, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, were invited to join NATO, which finally happened in 1999.

A NATO bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, began in August, 1995, against the Army of Republika Srpska, after the Srebrenica massacre. On 24 March 1999, NATO saw its first broad-scale military engagement in the Kosovo War, where it waged an 11-week bombing campaign, which NATO called Operation Allied Force, against what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in an effort to stop Serbian-led ethnic cleansing. A formal declaration of war never took place (in common with all wars since World War II). The conflict ended on 11 June 1999, when Yugoslavian leader Slobodan Milošević agreed to NATO’s demands by accepting UN resolution 1244. During the crisis, NATO also deployed one of its international reaction forces, the ACE Mobile Force (Land), to Albania as the Albania Force (AFOR), to deliver humanitarian aid to refugees from Kosovo.[11] NATO then helped establish the KFOR, a NATO-led force under a United Nations mandate that operated the military mission in Kosovo. In August-September 2001, the alliance also mounted Operation Essential Harvest, a mission disarming ethnic Albanian militias in the Republic of Macedonia.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and most other NATO countries opposed efforts to require the U.N. Security Council to approve NATO military strikes, such as the ongoing action against Yugoslavia, while France and some others claimed that the alliance needed U.N. approval. The U.S./U.K. side claimed that this would undermine the authority of the alliance, and they noted that Russia and China would have exercised their Security Council vetoes to block the strike on Yugoslavia, and could do the same in future conflicts where NATO intervention was required, thus nullifying the entire potency and purpose of the organization.

After the September 11 attacks

NATO Defence Ministers' Summit in Poiana Braşov, 13-14 October 2004 NATO Defence Ministers’ Summit in Poiana Braşov, 13-14 October 2004

The expansion of the activities and geographical reach of NATO grew even further as an outcome of the September 11 attacks. These caused as a response the provisional invocation (on September 12) of the collective security of NATO’s charter-Article 5 which states that any attack on a member state will be considered an attack against the entire group of members. The invocation was confirmed on 4 October 2001 when NATO determined that the attacks were indeed eligible under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. The eight official actions taken by NATO in response to the attacks included the first two examples of military action taken in response to an invocation of Article 5: Operation Eagle Assist and Operation Active Endeavour. Operation Active Endeavour is a naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea and is designed to prevent the movement of terrorists or weapons of mass destruction as well as to enhance the security of shipping in general. It began on October 4, 2001.

Despite this early show of solidarity, NATO faced a crisis little more than a year later, when on 10 February 2003, France and Belgium vetoed the procedure of silent approval concerning the timing of protective measures for Turkey in case of a possible war with Iraq. Germany did not use its right to break the procedure but said it supported the veto.

On the issue of Afghanistan on the other hand, the alliance showed greater unity: On 16 April 2003 NATO agreed to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The decision came at the request of Germany and the Netherlands, the two nations leading ISAF at the time of the agreement, and all 19 NATO ambassadors approved it unanimously. The handover of control to NATO took place on 11 August, and marked the first time in NATO’s history that it took charge of a mission outside the north Atlantic area. Canada had originally been slated to take over ISAF by itself on that date.

In January 2004, NATO appointed Minister Hikmet Çetin, of Turkey, as the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan. Minister Cetin is primarily responsible for advancing the political-military aspects of the Alliance in Afghanistan. In August 2004, following U.S. pressure, NATO formed the NATO Training Mission – Iraq, a training mission to assist the Iraqi security forces in conjunction with the U.S. led MNF-I.

On 31 July 2006, a NATO-led force, made up mostly of troops from Canada, Great Britain, Turkey and the Netherlands, took over military operations in the south of Afghanistan from a U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition.

Expansion and restructuring

Map of NATO countries chronological membership. Map of NATO countries chronological membership.

New NATO structures were also formed while old ones were abolished: The NATO Response Force (NRF) was launched at the 2002 Prague Summit on 21 November. On 19 June 2003, a major restructuring of the NATO military commands began as the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic were abolished and a new command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT), was established in Norfolk, Virginia, USA, and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) became the Headquarters of Allied Command Operations (ACO). ACT is responsible for driving transformation (future capabilities) in NATO, whilst ACO is responsible for current operations.

Membership went on expanding with the accession of seven more Northern European and Eastern European countries to NATO: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and also Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. They were first invited to start talks of membership during the 2002 Prague Summit, and joined NATO on 29 March 2004, shortly before the 2004 Istanbul Summit. The same month, NATO’s Baltic Air Policing began, which supported the sovereignty of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia by providing fighters to react to any unwanted aerial intrusions. Four fighters are based in Lithuania, provided in rotation by virtually all the NATO states. Operation Peaceful Summit temporarily enhanced this patrolling during the 2006 Riga Summit.

A number of other countries have also expressed a wish to join the alliance, including Albania, Croatia, Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Montenegro and Ukraine. From the Russian point of view, NATO’s eastward expansion since the end of the Cold War has been inconsistent with understandings between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George H. W. Bush which allowed for a peaceful unification of Germany. NATO’s expansion policy is seen as a continuation of a Cold War attempt to surround and isolate Russia.[15]

The 2006 NATO summit was held in Riga, Latvia, which had joined the Atlantic Alliance two years earlier. It is the first NATO summit to be held in a country that was part of the Soviet Union, and the second one in a former COMECON country (after the 2002 Prague Summit). Energy Security was one of the main themes of the Riga Summit.

At the April 2008 summit in Bucharest, Romania, NATO agreed to the accession of Croatia and Albania and invited them to join. The membership of Macedonia was vetoed by Greece, while Ukraine and Georgia were told that they will eventually become members.

Involvement in Afghanistan: Taking over ISAF

Current membership of NATO in Europe. Current membership of NATO in Europe.

Main article: International Security Assistance Force

In August 2003, NATO commenced its first mission ever outside Europe when it assumed control over International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. However, some critics feel that national caveats or other restrictions undermine the efficiency of ISAF. For instance, political scientist Joseph Nye stated in a 2006 article that “many NATO countries with troops in Afghanistan have ‘national caveats’ that restrict how their troops may be used. While the Riga summit relaxed some of these caveats to allow assistance to allies in dire circumstances, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, and the U.S. are doing most of the fighting in southern Afghanistan, while French, German, and Italian troops are deployed in the quieter north. Due to the intensity of the fighting in the south, France has recently allowed a squadron of Mirage 2000 fighter/attack aircraft to be moved into the area, to Khandahar, in order to reinforce the alliance’s efforts.[18] It is difficult to see how NATO can succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan unless it is willing to commit more troops and give commanders more flexibility.” If these caveats were to be eliminated, it is argued that this could help NATO to succeed.

 

NATO missile defence talks controversy

For some years, the United States negotiated with Poland and the Czech Republic for the deployment of interceptor missiles and a radar tracking system in the two countries. Both countries’ governments indicated that they would allow the deployment. The proposed American missile defence site in Central Europe is believed to be fully operational in 2015 and would be capable of covering most of Europe except part of Romania plus Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.

In April 2007, NATO’s European allies called for a NATO missile defence system which would complement the American National Missile Defense system to protect Europe from missile attacks and NATO’s decision-making North Atlantic Council held consultations on missile defence in the first meeting on the topic at such a senior level.[20]

In response, Russian president Vladimir Putin claimed that such a deployment could lead to a new arms race and could enhance the likelihood of mutual destruction. He also suggested that his country should freeze its compliance with the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)-which limits military deployments across the continent-until all NATO countries had ratified the adapted CFE treaty.

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said the system would not affect strategic balance or threaten Russia, as the plan is to base only 10 interceptor missiles in Poland with an associated radar in the Czech Republic.

On July 14, Russia notified its intention to suspend the CFE treaty, effective 150 days later.

Separately, NATO has decided to establish the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) at Tallinn, Estonia, to assist its member states,[23] in addition to the already-existing internal computer network defence team.

 

Membership

There are currently 26 members within NATO.

Date Country Expansion Notes
April 4, 1949 Flag of Belgium Belgium Founders  
Flag of Canada Canada  
Flag of Denmark Denmark  
Flag of France France France withdrew from the integrated military command in 1966 to pursue an independent defence system. However, there are now plans for it to rejoin sometime in 2008.[24]
Flag of Iceland Iceland Iceland, the sole member that does not have its own standing army, joined on the condition that it would not be expected to establish one. However, it has a Coast Guard and has recently provided troops trained in Norway for NATO peacekeeping.
Flag of Italy Italy  
Flag of Luxembourg Luxembourg  
Flag of the Netherlands Netherlands  
Flag of Norway Norway  
Flag of Portugal Portugal  
Flag of the United Kingdom United Kingdom  
Flag of the United States United States  
18 February 1952 Flag of Greece Greece First Greece withdrew its forces from NATO’s military command structure from 1974 to 1980 as a result of Greco-Turkish tensions following the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus.
Flag of Turkey Turkey  
9 May 1955 Flag of Germany Germany Second Joined as West Germany; Saarland reunited with it in 1957 and the territories of Berlin and the former German Democratic Republic reunited with it on 3 October 1990.
30 May 1982 Flag of Spain Spain Third  
12 March 1999 Flag of the Czech Republic Czech Republic Fourth  
Flag of Hungary Hungary  
Flag of Poland Poland  
29 March 2004 Flag of Bulgaria Bulgaria Fifth  
Flag of Estonia Estonia  
Flag of Latvia Latvia  
Flag of Lithuania Lithuania  
Flag of Romania Romania  
Flag of Slovakia Slovakia  
Flag of Slovenia Slovenia  
TBD April 2009 [25] Flag of Albania Albania Sixth  
Flag of Croatia Croatia  

At the NATO summit in Bucharest (April 2008) Albania and Croatia were officially invited to start accession talks with the alliance.

Future enlargement of NATO

       Current members     Invited members     Promised invitation      Intensified Dialogue     Membership not goal     Undeclared intent

     Current members     Invited members     Promised invitation      Intensified Dialogue     Membership not goal     Undeclared intent

In addition to the above listed members, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (or FYROM) was under consideration to enter NATO in 2009 but was not agreed upon. FYROM is likely to enter the alliance at some point, with Jane’s Defence Weekly commenting on 16 April 2008 that resolution to the naming issue that is holding up entry is ‘likely by the end of this year [2008] and no later than the 2009 summit.’ At the same 2008 summit in Bucharest, the communique explicitly said that Georgia and Ukraine ‘will become members of NATO.’

Other potential candidate countries include, in South-eastern Europe, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montengro. Other possible, long neutral countries that might become members are Finland and Sweden.

 

Cooperation with non-member states

     NATO member states      Partnership for Peace countries      Mediterranean Dialogue countries      NATO member states      Partnership for Peace countries      Mediterranean Dialogue countries

 

Euro-Atlantic Partnership

A double framework has been established to help further co-operation between the 26 NATO members and 23 “partner countries”.

  • The Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme was established in 1994 and is based on individual bilateral relations between each partner country and NATO: each country may choose the extent of its participation. The PfP programme is considered the operational wing of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership.
  • The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) on the other hand was first established on 29 May 1997, and is a forum for regular coordination, consultation and dialogue between all 49 participants.

The 23 partner countries are the following:

  • Former Soviet republics:
  1. Flag of Armenia Armenia
  2. Flag of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan
  3. Flag of Belarus Belarus
  4. Flag of Georgia (country) Georgia
  5. Flag of Kazakhstan Kazakhstan
  6. Flag of Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan
  7. Flag of Moldova Moldova
  8. Flag of Russia Russia
  9. Flag of Tajikistan Tajikistan
  10. Flag of Turkmenistan Turkmenistan
  11. Flag of Ukraine Ukraine
  12. Flag of Uzbekistan Uzbekistan
  • Countries that (though militarily neutral) possessed capitalist economies during the Cold War:
  1. Flag of Austria Austria
  2. Flag of Finland Finland
  3. Flag of Ireland Ireland
  4. Flag of Sweden Sweden
  5. Flag of Switzerland Switzerland
  • Nations that (though militarily neutral) possessed socialist economies during the Cold War:
  1. Flag of Albania Albania
  2. Flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina (as part of Yugoslavia)
  3. Flag of Croatia Croatia (as part of Yugoslavia)
  4. Flag of Montenegro Montenegro (as part of Yugoslavia)
  5. Flag of Serbia Serbia (as part of Yugoslavia)
  6. Flag of the Republic of Macedonia Republic of Macedonia (as part of Yugoslavia)
  • Flag of Malta Malta joined PfP on April 26, 1995, but its new government withdrew on October 27, 1996 Malta’s Membership in PfP was reactivated on April 3, 2008.
  • Flag of Cyprus Cyprus’s admission to PfP is resisted by Turkey, because of the Northern Cyprus issue. Because of this Cyprus is not participating in ESDP activities that use NATO assets and information.

Individual Partnership Action Plans

Launched at the November 2002 Prague Summit, Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) are open to countries that have the political will and ability to deepen their relationship with NATO.

Currently IPAPs are in implementation with the following countries:

  • Flag of Georgia (country) Georgia (29 October 2004)
  • Flag of Azerbaijan Azerbaijan (27 May 2005)
  • Flag of Armenia Armenia (16 December 2005)
  • Flag of Kazakhstan Kazakhstan (31 January 2006)
  • Flag of Moldova Moldova (19 May 2006)
  • Flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina (10 January 2008)

Structures

The NATO website divides the internal NATO organisation into political structures, military structures, and agencies & organisations immediately subordinate to NATO headquarters.

 

Political structure

Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer meeting George W. Bush on March 20, 2006. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer meeting George W. Bush on March 20, 2006.

Like any alliance, NATO is ultimately governed by its 26 member states. However, the North Atlantic Treaty, and other agreements, outline how decisions are to be made within NATO. Each of the 26 members sends a delegation or mission to NATO’s headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. The senior permanent member of each delegation is known as the Permanent Representative and is generally a senior civil servant or an experienced ambassador (and holding that diplomatic rank).

Together the Permanent Members form the North Atlantic Council (NAC), a body which meets together at least once a week and has effective political authority and powers of decision in NATO. From time to time the Council also meets at higher levels involving Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers or Heads of State or Government (HOSG) and it is at these meetings that major decisions regarding NATO’s policies are generally taken. However, it is worth noting that the Council has the same authority and powers of decision-making, and its decisions have the same status and validity, at whatever level it meets. NATO summits also form a further venue for decisions on complex issues, such as enlargement.

The meetings of the North Atlantic Council are chaired by the Secretary General of NATO and, when decisions have to be made, action is agreed upon on the basis of unanimity and common accord. There is no voting or decision by majority. Each nation represented at the Council table or on any of its subordinate committees retains complete sovereignty and responsibility for its own decisions.

The second pivotal member of each country’s delegation is the Military Representative, a senior officer from each country’s armed forces. Together the Military Representatives form the Military Committee (MC), a body responsible for recommending to NATO’s political authorities those measures considered necessary for the common defence of the NATO area. Its principal role is to provide direction and advice on military policy and strategy. It provides guidance on military matters to the NATO Strategic Commanders, whose representatives attend its meetings, and is responsible for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance under the authority of the Council. Like the council, from time to time the Military Committee also meets at a higher level, namely at the level of Chiefs of defence, the most senior military officer in each nation’s armed forces. The Defence Planning Committee excludes France, due to that country’s 1966 decision to remove itself from NATO’s integrated military structure.On a practical level, this means that issues that are acceptable to most NATO members but unacceptable to France may be directed to the Defence Planning Committee for more expedient resolution. Such was the case in the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The current Chairman of the NATO Military Committee is Ray Henault of Canada (since 2005).

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly, presided by José Lello, is made up of legislators from the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as 13 associate members. It is however officially a different structure from NATO, and has as aim to join together deputies of NATO countries in order to discuss security policies.

Subordinate to the political structure are the International Staff and International Military Staff, which administer NATO programmes and carry out high-level political, military, and also civil emergency planning.[39]

Over the years, non-governmental citizens’ groups have grown up in support of NATO, broadly under the banner of the Atlantic Council/Atlantic Treaty Association movement.

List of officials

Secretaries General
1 General Lord Ismay Flag of the United Kingdom United Kingdom 4 April 1952-16 May 1957
2 Paul-Henri Spaak Flag of Belgium Belgium 16 May 1957-21 April 1961
3 Dirk Stikker Flag of the Netherlands Netherlands 21 April 1961-1 August 1964
4 Manlio Brosio Flag of Italy Italy 1 August 1964-1 October 1971
5 Joseph Luns Flag of the Netherlands Netherlands 1 October 1971-25 June 1984
6 Lord Carrington Flag of the United Kingdom United Kingdom 25 June 1984-1 July 1988
7 Manfred Wörner Flag of West Germany West Germany/Germany 1 July 1988-13 August 1994
8 Sergio Balanzino Flag of Italy Italy 13 August 1994-17 October 1994
9 Willy Claes Flag of Belgium Belgium 17 October 1994-20 October 1995
10 Sergio Balanzino Flag of Italy Italy 20 October 1995-5 December 1995
11 Javier Solana Flag of Spain Spain 5 December 1995-6 October 1999
12 Lord Robertson of Port Ellen Flag of the United Kingdom United Kingdom 14 October 1999-1 January 2004
13 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Flag of the Netherlands Netherlands 1 January 2004-present
Deputy Secretary General of NATO
# Name Country Duration
1 Sergio Balanzino Flag of Italy Italy 1994-2001
2 Alessandro Minuto Rizzo Flag of Italy Italy 2001-present

Military structure

NATO E-3A flying with US F-16s in a NATO exercise. NATO E-3A flying with US F-16s in a NATO exercise.

NATO’s military operations are directed by the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and split into two Strategic Commands both commanded by a senior US officer assisted by a staff drawn from across NATO. The Strategic Commanders are responsible to the Military Committee for the overall direction and conduct of all Alliance military matters within their areas of command.

Before 2003 the Strategic Commanders were the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) but the current arrangement is to separate command responsibility between Allied Command Transformation (ACT), responsible for transformation and training of NATO forces, and Allied Command Operations, responsible for NATO operations world wide.

The commander of Allied Command Operations retained the title “Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)”, and is based in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) located at Casteau, north of the Belgian city of Mons. This is about 80 km (50 miles) south of NATO’s political headquarters in Brussels. ACO is headed by SACEUR, a US four star general with the dual-hatted role of heading US European Command, which is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. SHAPE was in Paris until 1966, when French president Charles de Gaulle withdrew French forces from the Atlantic Alliance. NATO’s headquarters were then forced to move to Belgium, while many military units had to move.

ACO includes Joint Force Command Brunssum in the Netherlands, Joint Force Command Naples in Italy, and Joint Command Lisbon, all multinational headquarters with many nations represented. JFC Brunssum has its land component, Allied Land Component Command Headquarters Heidelberg at Heidelberg, Germany, its air component at Ramstein in Germany, and its naval component at the Northwood Headquarters in the northwest suburbs of London. JFC Naples has its land component in Madrid, air component at Izmir, Turkey, and naval component in Naples, Italy. It also directs KFOR in Kosovo. JC Lisbon is a smaller HQ with no subordinate commands. Lajes Field, in the Portuguese Azores, is an important transatlantic staging post. Directly responsible to SACEUR is the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force at NATO Air Base Geilenkirchen in Germany where a jointly funded fleet of E-3 Sentry AWACS airborne radar aircraft is located. The C-17s of the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability, to be made operational in the next few years, will be based at Pápa airfield in Hungary, and probably come under SACEUR’s control.

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is based in the former Allied Command Atlantic headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, USA. Allied Command Atlantic, usually known as SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic), after its commander, became ACT in 2003. It is headed by the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), a US four-star general or admiral with the dual-hatted role as commander US Joint Forces Command (COMUSJFCOM). There is also an ACT command element located at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.

Subordinate ACT organisations include the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) located in Stavanger, Norway (in the same site as the Norwegian NJHQ); the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland; the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Monsanto, Portugal; and the NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC),La Spezia, Italy.

Organisations and Agencies

The NATO website lists forty-three different agencies and organisation and five project committees/offices as of 15 May 2008. They include:

  • nine logistics bodies (including five pipeline and one medical), which include the:
    • NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
    • Central European Pipeline System
    • NATO Pipeline System
  • five production logistics bodies, including the:
    • NATO Eurofighter and Typhoon Management Agency
  • four standardisation bodies, including the NATO Standardization Agency
  • three civil emergency planning bodies
  • five Air Defence & Air Traffic Control bodies, including the:
    • NATO ACCS Management Agency (NACMA), based in Brussels, manages around a hundred persons in charge of the Air Control and Command System (ACCS) due for 2009.
    • NATO Programming Centre
  • one AEW body, the NATO Airborne Early Warning & Control Programme Management Organisation
  • eight communications & information systems bodies, including the:
    • NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A),[43] reporting to the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Organisation (NC3O). The SHAPE Technical Centre (STC) in The Hague (Netherlands) merged in 1996 with the NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA) based in Brussels (Belgium), forming the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A). The agency comprises around 650 staff, of which around 400 are located in The Hague and 250 in Brussels. It reports to the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3B).
    • NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency (NCSA),[44] based in Mons (BEL), was established in August 2004 from the former NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA).
  • one electronic warfare agency
  • one meteorological body, the Military Committee Meteorological Group (MCMG)
  • one oceanography body, the Military Oceanography (MILOC) Group
  • the Research and Technology Agency (RTA),[45] reporting to the NATO Research and Technology Organisation (RTO);
  • four education & training bodies, including the NATO School and NATO Defence College
  • five project committees and offices:
    • Alliance Ground Surveillance Capability Provisional Project Office (AGS/PPO)
    • Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES)
    • NATO Continuous Acquisition and Life Cycle Support Office (CALS)
    • NATO FORACS Office
    • Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center (MSIAC)